The Problem of Revelation in Catholic Dogmatic Theology

Does God reveal himself in order to make himself known and take a place within our rationality? Or does he instead reveal himself in order to allow himself to be loved, and to love us?

— Jean-Luc Marion, Givenness and Revelation, p. 29.

The first chapter of Jean-Luc Marion’s work, Givenness and Revelation, summarizes the state of the art of revelation as a major theological concept (see p. 8–29). After reading the chapter in full, I conclude that Marion, in his somewhat lengthy and difficult prose, was trying to show his readers that the epistemological appropriation of revelation ended up causing a number of contradictions (aporia) regarding its definition and status.

Marion started by pointing out the relatively late development of the concept of revelation in the discourse of Catholic dogmatic theology. Quoting from multiple sources, such as the works of Avery Dulles, Bernard Sesboüé, and Jean-Yves Lacoste, Marion stated that the concept of revelation has never made a major appearance in the golden era of Christian theology, an era which spans through the first twelve centuries of the Anno Domini. Although one could argue that the theme of revelation is prevalent in the works of Patristic theologians, such as Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, and Clement of Alexandria, Marion had a point when he stated that they have never used the term apokalypsis and revelatio to denote God’s act of revealing himself to the world. Instead, the Patristics used these terms to refer to a certain form of biblical literature, which contains visions pertaining to the end of the world and the afterlife.

According to Marion and his sources, it was Francisco Suarez, who published his works in the 17th century, that first used the term revelation to denote God’s act in revealing himself to the world. This usage marked the starting point of the development of revelation as a major theological concept, which then was followed by the German theologians of the 19th century and the Roman Catholic Church in the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), a religious event which produced the so-called, “Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation,” otherwise known as Dei Verbum. Marion, like the sources he quoted, was baffled, because revelation, a major and arguably the most basic theme in Christian theology (for it is the foundation which makes the aforementioned discourse possible), is paradoxically one of the latest to develop in comparison to the other loci theologici.

To gain some amount of clarity regarding the late development of the concept of revelation, Marion investigated the works of Thomas Aquinas, particularly his Summa Theologiae and Summa contra Gentiles. In both of these works, Marion found that Aquinas had already attempted an epistemological appropriation on the concept of revelation. The Scholastic theologian first defined revelation as a form of knowledge which comes directly from the Word of God, a knowledge that he also termed, “the sacred doctrine” (or sacra doctrina). Then, he contrasted revelation to natural knowledge (or philosophia; metaphysica), which can be obtained through the instrument of human reason. Aquinas explicitly stated that philosophia, specifically metaphysica, can only go so far as to know the principles of God, i.e., the principles which underlie the existence of all beings. Therefore, in order to know God fully, humanity need a more proper knowledge, which can only be provided by the sacra doctrina.

From the aforementioned distinction, one can already suppose that Aquinas was trying to put revelation on a relatively superior position to natural knowledge. As if affirming this supposition, Aquinas tried to develop the superiority of revelation by adding to it a soteriological necessity, as shown in the following paraphrase (see ibid, p. 15):

… if philosophical theology held exclusive ownership of the knowledge of God, the great majority of men would have very little of it and very poor access to it; revelation, therefore, must enter in immediately after the natural light, for an imperative pastoral reason: the ignorant also have the right to salvation [my emphasis].

It was in this account of superiority that Marion first discovered the aporia of revelation, i.e., the problem in its relation to natural knowledge. On one hand, Aquinas tried to distinguish revelation from natural knowledge by first putting an emphasis to the latter’s incapacity of knowing God fully, and then differentiating the former from the latter by asserting its accessibility, as shown in the paraphrase provided earlier. On the other hand, Aquinas also considered revelation as a form of knowledge that complements, even surpasses, natural knowledge. And, to complicate the problem, Aquinas did not explicitly state what he meant when he defined revelation as a form of knowledge.

After explaining the problematic relation between revelation and natural knowledge, Marion went on to investigate Aquinas’ conception on the science of the blessed (scientia Dei), which was prevalent particularly in his Summa contra Gentiles. According to the French philosopher, Aquinas defined scientia Dei as the knowledge of God par excellence, in which God reveals himself through visions (intuitus) instead of his Word. The Scholastic theologian then posited scientia Dei in an even more superior position than the revelation (sacra doctrina), stating that the latter is derived from the former. Furthermore, to prevent the univocity between revealed knowledge and natural knowledge, Aquinas differentiated two kinds of science, each pertaining to scientia Dei and philosophica or metaphysica. Consequently, the status of revelation as a form of science or knowledge depends upon scientia Dei, the knowledge which it is derived from. This whole conception, Marion argued, adds to the aporia of revelation, for scientia Dei is eschatological in nature; and revealed theology, therefore, “cannot have access to principles that would make it a science” (see ibid, p. 20).

Despite discovering the aforementioned aporia in Aquinas’ epistemological appropriation, Marion refused to put the blame on the Scholastic theologian. Instead, Marion argued that Aquinas only explicated the thing which is at stake in the concept of revelation, that is (see ibid):

Can, and must, revelation, examined in its unquestionable characteristic of proceeding, mediately or immediately, from the Word of God, particularly as transmitted by the Scriptures (sacra doctrina; Sacra Scriptura), insist on the status of a science?

Marion then returned to the relatively late development of the concept of revelation in the 17th and 20th century, claiming that these developments were attempts to solve its aporia and define its status. One such development is the notion of propositional revelation, which was constructed by Suarez in the 17th century. In Marion’s interpretation, Suarez reduced the status of revelation into that of natural knowledge based on his conception that the latter is the foundation of the former. Another form of development, which stands in contrast to Suarez’s propositional revelation, is The Roman Catholic Church’s Dei Verbum, which developed the Thomistic notion of revelebile to define natural knowledge as a form of revelation.

Finally, against these developments, Marion posited a question which pertains to the nature of revelation, i.e., as a form of knowledge (epistemological) or a form of phenomenon (phenomenological). The question is quoted directly in the beginning of this entry. When it is read side by side with his statement that there is a possibility to, “challenging it [the epistemological appropriation], provided, of course, that a more fitting interpretation — that is to say a more powerful one — can be provided,” the question implies that Marion was attempting to solve the aporia of revelation through the means of his phenomenology (see ibid). Presumably (considering the title of chapter 3), such phenomenology will involve the notion of saturated phenomenon and excess, two of the five important notions in Marion’s corpus.

What I find most interesting in this chapter is Marion’s way of positioning himself in the discourse that he contributed to. From the beginning of his work (see the entry on Tuesday, June 7, 2022), the French philosopher has stated, although oftentimes implicitly, that his primary lens is philosophical phenomenology. In other words, Marion started by assuming the position of a philosopher instead of a theologian. As the first chapter proceeds, however, one can see that Marion was trying his best to make his position (and consequently his proposal in the later chapters) relevant to the discourse of Catholic dogmatic theology. The most explicit form of this attempt is his refusal to attack Thomas Aquinas’ epistemological appropriation on revelation, despite the fact that it is his appropriation which caused the aporia in the first place. Judging by his clarification that he did not, “disqualify the Thomistic argumentation,” but rather, “perfectly displays what is at stake in it,” I would say that Marion respected the quasi-canonical status which Aquinas’ works have attained among Roman Catholic theologians. His phenomenological approach, therefore, was proposed as an alternative solution to a theological problem instead of a critique to a theological concept, and a philosophically reasonable alternative at that.

The question that might arise in regard to this unique positioning, then, are these: Is Marion a philosopher, or a theologian? Is he a philosopher attempting to solve a theological problem, or on the contrary, a theologian using a philosophical approach? Based on what I’ve known so far, I would say that Marion is the former, namely, a philosopher attempting to solve a theological problem. One would not easily conclude that a student of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, whom was also trained in the way of Edmund Husserl’s philosophical phenomenology, is a Catholic theologian in a full-fledged sense. Furthermore, one could also refer to Ramona Fotiade and David Jasper’s testimony, which was supported by Marion’s own statement in Being Given, that his project consists in, “liberating the possibility in phenomenology,” including the possibility for God (see p. 234). That being said, I would also argue that Marion might be one of the most theological [and Catholic] philosopher that the world has ever seen.

Works Cited

Marion, Jean-Luc. 2002. Being given: Toward a phenomenology of givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

_______. 2016. Givenness and revelation, trans. Stephen E. Lewis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.