The Logic of the Revelation of God
This revelation itself is what draws.
— Augustine of Hippo on John 6:44a, “Tractates on the Gospel of John,” p. 264.
For it is not so much the reason that draws the will [toward the evidence], as the will that draws the reason toward faith.
— William of St. Thierry, The Mirror of Faith, p. 33.
No one can see that which is uncovered (apokalypsis) unless she believes it; but if no one can believe if she does not will to do so, and no one can will if she does not love, then no one can see unless she loves — and thus, in the end, in a situation of revelation (apokalypsis, uncovering), knowing is the same as loving, which is contrary of the situation of truth (aletheia, unconcealment), where knowing means seeing and knowing directly.
— Jean-Luc Marion, Givenness and Revelation, p. 45.
In the light of problems explicated by Thomas Aquinas, as seen in the previous chapter, Jean-Luc Marion continued his explanation regarding the epistemological appropriation of revelation by quoting from various Enlightenment philosophers. Marion argued that it is the inavailability [due to its eschatological nature] of the science of the blessed (scientia Dei et beatorum), which constitutes the scientific nature of revelation, that caused its subjugation by the Enlightenment philosophers through the means of natural knowledge. This act of subduing the infinite was manifested in three approaches: (1) equating revelation with natural knowledge (and thus God per se with the moral god, which is prevalent in the thoughts of J. Locke and J. J. Rousseau); (2) critiquing revelation on the basis of natural knowledge (which is prevalent in the thoughts of David Hume, Baruch Spinoza, and Immanuel Kant); and (3) constructing a form of hypothetical concept which can serve as the foundation of revelation (which is relevant particularly in the thoughts of Johann G. Fichte and Georg W. F. Hegel).
In response to the approaches aforementioned, and without ceasing to put Aquinas’ problem under consideration, Marion invoked three thinkers whom have constructed the logic of revelation by inverting the logic of natural knowledge in such a way that it is the will which precedes the knowledge [of God] and not the other way around. Such thinkers include Augustine of Hippo (quoted above), William of St. Thierry (quoted above), and Blaise Pascal, whom resisted the Cartesian adage by stating that, “the saints, speaking of divine matters, say that you have to love them in order to know them” (see Jean-Luc Marion, Givenness and Revelation, p. 36–37; Blaise Pascal, Pensees and Other Writings, p. 193). With reference to these thinkers, Marion proposed a logic (quoted above) which enables one to consider revelation as a science despite the temporary absence of scientia Dei et beatorum. Such logic stands in contrast to that of the truth, for if the un-concealment (aletheia) of truth presupposes the act of seeing and knowing directly, then the process of uncovering (apokalypsis) revelation presupposes the act of willing, loving, and believing.
It is on this contrarian logic of revelation that Marion constructed his phenomenological account. He started by defining one of his central notions, namely saturated phenomenon. According to the French philosopher, saturated phenomenon refers to an event which is constituted, “by the excess within it of intuition over the concept or signification” (see Jean-Luc Marion, Givenness and Revelation, p. 49). In other words, saturated phenomenon manifests itself in an event that fill the subject’s (I will refer to human as the subject from now on) visibility to the brim, to the point that the subject themselves cannot conceptualize said event in a precise and accurate manner. Therefore, a saturated phenomenon demands continuous interpretation, in which the subject, under the role of a witness, tries to comprehend the thing that gives itself fully in its self-abandonment as an event. Such phenomenon stands in contrast to common-law phenomenon and poor phenomena, which pertain to Kant’s notion of transcendental reason (that is, rational abstraction of empirical observation) and pure reason (or metaphysics) respectively.
After defining saturated phenomenon, Marion quoted and referred to several biblical verses which testify that Jesus Christ, the icon of God par excellence, is one such phenomenon. These verses include Philippi 2:7, John 20:19, Matthew 17:3, Mark 9:4, Luke 9:30; 24:34, and 1 Corinthians 15:6–8, which explicitly state Jesus Christ’s act in, “rendered himself visible,” and, “made himself seen” (see Givenness and Revelation, p. 48–49). Marion also referred to the narrative of transfiguration (Lk. 9:28–36; Mt. 17:1–8; Mk. 9:2–8), the sermon in the Temple (Jn. 12:20–43), and the narrative of resurrection (Lk. 24:13–35; Jn. 20:11–18), while putting an emphasis on the incapability of the witnesses (i.e., his disciples, the crowd, the Pharisees, and Mary Magdalene) to recognize Jesus Christ’s phenomenality and givenness (let alone conceptualize it) until he made himself known by the means of the scriptures (Old Testament) or his own words in the past. Lastly, Marion referred to John 16:12–13; 20:30; 21:25, Luke 24:25, and Ephesus 3:17–19, which explicitly state the lack of the subject’s, “concepts and [their] ignorance of the significations of God,” that prevents them from bearing such saturated phenomenon, that is, unless they can sustain this saturation through the foundations of charity and the works of Holy Spirit (see ibid, p. 60). The French philosopher then decided to analyze the phenomenality of Christ further in the next chapter.
While this chapter provides an interesting and sensible development on an alternative account on revelation (and a phenomenological one at that), I can see [and foresee] that the chapter [and the work as a whole] is lacking in one aspect, namely, further elaboration on the issue of revelation in the reality of religious pluralism. In my opinion, this shortcoming is rather strange for two reasons. First, Givenness and Revelation is a relatively new work (which is published in 2016) in the department of philosophy of religion. This means that the work was published way after the rise of consciousness in regards to the reality of religious pluralism, which took place in the West from 1980s onwards. Second, Marion himself has never stated anything about the limitation of the scope of his work to Christian theology. This silence is rather problematic considering the fact that Christianity is not the only religion that claims its revelatory status (for there are also Judaism, Islam, and numerous religious sects that stem from them).
Regarding this particular shortcoming, I would argue that Marion’s phenomenological account on revelation will face a problem in distinguishing true revelation from delusions. The reason underlying my argument is not only the fact that the French philosopher himself had already mentioned such problems earlier (albeit in an underwhelming manner), but also the fact that his proposal is built on a logic contrary to that of natural knowledge, which has been used by many thinkers to distinguish true knowledge from false ones. Consequently, this problem might open the possibility for irrational belief(s), i.e., belief(s) which claim the status of revelation and truth (for the two are alike in regard to their necessity) on the basis of will and love alone. Such possibility might end up endangering human life, especially if the witnesses are to enforce their belief to those who oppose them.
Works Cited
Augustine of Hippo. 1988. Tractates on the Gospel of John, 11–27. In The fathers of the church: A new translation (Patristic series), vol. 79, trans. John W. Rettig. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press.
Marion, Jean-Luc. 2016. Givenness and revelation, trans. Stephen E. Lewis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pascal, Blaise, Anthony Levi & Honor Levi (eds.). 1995. Pensees and other writings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
William of St. Thierry. 1979. The mirror of faith, trans. Thomas X. Davis. Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications.
